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Automatic acquisition of action effect associations may serve as a parsimonious account of
how people acquire the basis for intentionally controlled action. However, recent research
suggests that learning or the expression of action effect links might depend on whether
task demands impose either a stimulus based mode of action control or an intention based
action control mode. In the current study we develop a paradigm that allows the mode of
action control to be varied via instructions while keeping stimuli identical. Participants were
to respond to the location of a cloud of dots. Their actions were followed by predictable
visual effects, either consistently congruent or incongruent with the location of the action.
In Experiment 1, a displaced new cloud of random dots was presented as a spatial action
effect. In Experiment 2 an arrow was presented as effect with a pointing direction congru-
ent or incongruent to the response position. The location of the stimulus in the reference
frame was easy to detect in some of the trials while the location of the cloud of dots was
completely ambiguous in others.The instruction manipulation targeted the latter trials, sug-
gesting to one group of participants to freely choose a key in a difficult trial, while asking
another group to react to their spontaneous impression in the event of a difficult stimulus.
In this way, we aimed at rendering actions either as stimulus driven or internally generated.
By this we could investigate how effect anticipation changed with practice depending on
action mode. We employed the impact of action effect compatibility on speed and choice
of action as a measure for action effect anticipation. Our results suggest that action effect
associations can be acquired when instructions suggest stimulus based action control or
intention based action control. Instructions aiming at the mode of task processing can
influence when and how action effect links influence behavior.
Keywords: action effect, effect anticipation, stimulus based, intention based, instruction manipulation
INTRODUCTION
Human actions are controlled by one of two principles. On the one
hand, people react to stimuli in the environment that are associ-
ated with a response based on a known and practiced mapping
(e.g., stopping at a red traffic light). On the other hand, people
choose actions according to their current goals when prompted to
do so (e.g., sign with branching arrows). Red color can lead to a
direct abrupt halt in the case of a traffic light, but may serve as a
cue to choose between stopping to enjoy the view vs. continuing a
journey in the case of a meadow with poppy flowers.
While the ideomotor approach (e.g., James, 1890; Greenwald,
1970; Prinz, 1987; see Shin et al., 2010) generally holds that actions
are triggered by their anticipated perceptual consequences, recent
research (Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak, 2009) has sug-
gested that this might be especially pronounced in endogenously
triggered actions (see also Umbach et al., 2012 and Kemper et al.,
2012). In simple tasks requiring that one of two keys is pressed with
tones as action effects, participants readily formed associations
between actions and action effects – if they were freely choos-
ing actions when prompted. However, in contrast to past findings
with explicit instructions (e.g., Kunde, 2001) or more complicated
mappings (cf. Ziessler et al., 2004) no action effect learning was
evident when participants were responding based on stimulus
discrimination. This challenging finding warrants further explo-
ration for several reasons. Conditions differed in stimulus material
(i.e., free choice prompt vs. stimulus to be discriminated) and
instruction (i.e., discriminative response required vs. free choice
required). Free choice prompts vs. stimuli in choice reaction tasks
differed with regard to the visual features (i.e., variability in the
stimulus vs. homogeneity in the prompt).
We suggest that in many situations free choice vs. forced choice
is a matter of how a situation is interpreted. This interpretation
can be set up by instructions and other constraints and can quickly
shift in character from one second to the next one. On a trip
with young children, a sign of a restroom can, depending on the
instruction the children provide, either trigger immediate action
or, alternatively, trigger considerations on whether or not the facil-
ities should be used in order to avoid later hurry. A branch in the
road with a short and slow vs. a fast and long route might lead to
a spontaneous choice on some days while on others we are told to
hurry and thus, the choice aspect of the branching seems less pro-
nounced. Situations prompting a free choice vs. those demanding
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a certain reaction might occur in close succession. It is conceivable
that boosting action effect associations in a free choice situation
transfers to a more structured forced choice situation. Pfister et al.
(2011) have made a similar suggestion. They proposed that an
intention based mode of action adopted in a free choice task might
be maintained in a forced choice task. Without such a spillover
effect of formerly established action mode, action effect associ-
ations might remain ineffective and thus undetected in a choice
reaction task that is performed by strong reliance on stimulus
based rather than goal directed processing.
In the current study the measurement of action effect associ-
ations employed the backward compatibility between (a) action
and (b) the anticipated consequences. A response that is expected
to be followed by a matching effect can be executed faster than a
response that likely will lead to a non-matching effect. If antic-
ipation of action effects (i.e., the activation of effect codes) is a
constitutional part of action planning, then effects should have
a backward influence on action (cf. Kunde et al., 2004). Specifi-
cally, the compatibility of the current action with the anticipated
action effect should influence the speed with which the action is
executed. For instance, pressing a left key that will predictably lead
to a visual action effect on the left should be faster compared to
a left key press that will lead to an action effect on the right. For
instance, similar to the current study, Pfister et al., 2010, Exper-
iment 2) presented participants with a mix of free choice and
forced choice trials. They used the reaction time (RT) of responses
that predictably led to an incompatible vs. to a compatible action
effect as a measure of the influence of action effect anticipation on
behavior. On forced choice trials, participants saw an arrow point-
ing left or pointing right as a stimulus demanding a left or right
key press. On free choice trials an exclamation mark demanded
a free response choice. In addition, Pfister et al. (2010) used cues
at the beginning of each trial to signal whether the action effects
would be incompatible (effect was a box on the screen on the side
opposite to the response) or compatible (effect was a box on the
same side) or neutral (box in the middle). Results showed that
the anticipation of an incompatible action effect led to slower RTs
than the anticipation of a neutral or compatible effect. Notably,
this was the case for free choice as well as forced choice trials when
they were mixed (Experiment 2). In the blocked version (in Exper-
iment 1), however, only the free choice trials led to an impact of
action effect compatibility on RT.
Different from the design of the current study, acquisition of
action effect associations has often been assessed in terms of com-
patibility effects in a test phase after a substantial amount of
learning trials (cf. Greenwald, 1970; Elsner and Hommel, 2001;
Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak, 2009, 2012). First partic-
ipants perform a learning phase in which actions are predictably
followed by specific effects (auditory or visual). Next, in a test
phase participants are presented with the former action effects
as stimuli. In one version (e.g., Elsner and Hommel, 2001; Maes,
2006; Hoffmann et al., 2009) they are to freely choose a response
whenever one of the former action effects is presented while using
the same responses as in the learning phase. The dependent mea-
sure is the proportion of free choices that follows the association of
action and effect that was present in the learning phase. In another
version (e.g., Hommel et al., 2003; Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and
Waszak, 2009) participants are prescribed which key to press for
either of the former action effects once these are presented as stim-
uli in the test phase. In this case, the dependent measure is the RT
advantage for a setup in which the assignment of keys to former
action effect matches rather than mismatches the experiences from
the learning phase.
Test phases are generally applied after substantial exposure
to the contingency between actions and effects. Therefore, the
dynamics of how the impact of action effect compatibility on
performance evolves with practice are difficult to assess – unless
variations to the length of the learning phase or multiple test phases
are used (cf. Wolfensteller and Ruge, 2011). These dynamics are
especially relevant in the light of a recent discussion, which sug-
gests that stimulus based action control mode vs. intention based
action control mode lead to differences in the expression of action
effect knowledge rather than its acquisition (Ansorge, 2002; Pfister
et al., 2010, 2011). It is conceivable that action effect associations
are acquired in a learning phase with stimulus based action control
(cf. Hommel, 1996; Ziessler et al., 2004) just as in a learning phase
with intention based action control (e.g., Herwig and Waszak,
2009), but are not expressed in a later test phase if action con-
trol is stimulus based. Pfister and colleagues suggested that the
mode of action control might shift slowly. It is therefore possible
that when participants perform under stimulus based mode of
action control at the end of the learning phase, they might transfer
the according mode of action control to the test phase. Therefore,
action effect associations might not influence behavior.
In choice reaction tasks, action control might not be purely
stimulus based, but instead include effect anticipation. Before
reaching a high level of proficiency in a choice reaction task, par-
ticipants are likely to use anticipated action effects and stimulus
response (S-R) links to control behavior (cf. Hazeltine, 2002; Band
et al., 2009; Gaschler et al., 2012). Only at the end of a sufficiently
long practice phase, strong S-R links might lead to a situation
where stimulus based action control dominates over intention
based control (compare also Ackerman and Woltz, 1994). It might
be difficult to predict whether and when the change in mode of
action control takes place. This suggests continuous assessment
of action effect anticipation rather than assessment with a single
test phase. Apart from the amount of practice it may for instance
depend on the saliency of action effects as well as on the size of
the set of actions, stimuli, and effects whether or not the stimulus
based mode of action control becomes dominant during a choice
reaction task or not. Work successfully employing forced choice
tasks for providing participants with action effect links has usually
used a setup with four keys and at least four action effects (cf.
Ziessler et al., 2004; Nattkemper et al., 2010). The work directly
contrasting action effect learning under stimulus based vs. inten-
tion based action control (Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak,
2009) has used smaller sets. In the latter case, stimulus based mode
of action control might have become dominant by the end of the
acquisition phase. If it would have been tested, action effect asso-
ciations may have influenced RT at the beginning of a learning
phase when task demands were still high.
The present work targets how, depending on the mode of action
control, practice affects the acquisition and expression of action
effect associations. Rather than employing a design involving a
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition December 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 578 | 2
Gaschler and Nattkemper Instruction and effect anticipation
learning and a test phase, we used a setup similar to Pfister
et al., 2010, see above). Via instructions we aimed at manipu-
lating whether participants assumed an action vs. reaction focus.
The task contained 1/3rd of trials in which stimuli were ambigu-
ous with respect to the relevant feature stimulus position. In these
trials, a random cloud of dots was placed exactly in the middle
of a reference frame – rather than at one of its borders. For the
two instruction conditions, identical stimuli (random clouds of
dots) were either referred to as prompts for free choices or as to be
discriminated stimuli. In the forced choice instruction condition,
stimulus based action control was suggested as instructions asked
for fast key presses spontaneously conveying the first impression of
the position of a cloud within the reference frame (left vs. right; or
up vs. down – depending on balancing scheme; compare Figure 1).
In the free choice instruction condition, intention based action
control was fostered as participants were told in advance that the
position of the clouds of dots was often indiscriminate and in such
cases freely chosen spontaneous key presses were the action to be
taken. The ambiguous trials, in which the position of the cloud
could not be objectively discriminated, were intermixed with tri-
als with a clear placement of the cloud of dots in the reference
frame. We assumed that, depending on instructions concerning
the ambiguous trials, participants would either adopt an intention
based or a stimulus driven mode of action control. According
to the suggestion of Pfister et al. (2011), this mode of action
should also influence the processing of non-ambiguous stimuli.
Thereby, instruction can be expected to modulate the expression
of action effect associations in RTs in trials with discriminable and
indiscriminable stimuli.
So far, an experimental paradigm has been lacking that allows
the choice character of a task involving action effect learning to be
flexibly varied. Flexibility might either result from varying stimu-
lus discriminability on a continuum or, alternatively, from varying
instructions while keeping stimuli identical. For instance, depend-
ing on instructions, identical stimuli might be either processed as
free choice prompts or as difficult stimuli in a discrimination par-
adigm. Conceivably, it may even be possible to gradually vary the
extent to which a task is processed as a discrimination task vs. a
free choice task by varying stimulus discriminability between (a)
clearly discriminable and (b) perfectly ambiguous.
Here we report the first steps for exploring the space of exper-
imental manipulations for such a paradigm. Gradual variations
of stimulus discriminability have been systematically applied in
research on perceptual grouping principles (e.g., grouping by
proximity or by similarity in Kubovy and Van den Berg, 2008).
The probability of perceiving one rather than the other version of a
multi-stable ambiguous stimulus gradually increased with increas-
ing proximity or similarity. Changes in reports varied gradually
between extreme ends of stimulus discriminability (i.e., between
stimuli with one dominant percept vs. stimuli with two equally
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FIGURE 1 | Example stimuli and time-line for Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, arrows were used as action effects instead of clouds of dots.
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likely percepts). The authors refer to their approach as phenom-
enological psychophysics. There are no objectively (in)correct
answers as it is the participant’s task to report what they perceive in
a multi-stable stimulus. Participants can only respond incorrectly
in the sense that they do not truthfully report their percept.
It is an open question whether or not both desired options for
experimental manipulation are effective at the same time – (a)
instruction for free choice vs. for stimulus discrimination and
(b) variation in stimulus discriminability. Conceivably, instruc-
tions overrule objective discriminability. If participants are told
to truthfully report their percepts they might perform in forced
choice mode even if stimuli are objectively perfectly ambiguous.
Conversely, participants who are told to freely press any key in
the case of difficult to discriminate stimuli may transfer this free
choice mode of action control even to easily discriminable stim-
uli. For instance, Pfister et al. (2010) have suggested that once an
intention based mode of action control is established through free
choice trials, this mode of action control might also transfer to tri-
als with an imperative stimulus. This suggests that the same easily
discriminable stimuli might be processed in one or the other mode
of action control depending on whether the ambiguous stimuli in
the surrounding trials are interpreted as free choice prompts or as
difficult to discriminate stimuli.
We tested the impact of instructions concerning the mode of
action control on action effect anticipation in two experiments.
In Experiment 1 we used a setup that employed clouds of dots
both as stimuli/free choice prompts and as action effects. Action
effects were highly similar to the stimuli in order to ensure that
participants could not avoid processing the visual action effects.
In Experiment 2 we used arrows as action effects instead.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-eight university students from Berlin (38 female; mean age
23 years, SD= 5.6) took part in Experiment 1 and were paid C6.
They were randomly assigned to the free choice vs. forced choice
instruction condition (N = 29 for both conditions). Due to hard-
ware failure, the data of one participant from the free choice
condition were lost. Seventy university students from Berlin took
part in Experiment 2 (57 female; mean age 23 years, SD= 4.0)
and randomly assigned to either instruction condition. Three par-
ticipants were excluded due to procedural problems, leaving 35
participants in the free choice condition and 32 in the forced choice
condition.
MATERIALS
Experiment 1 and 2 were identical except in the action effects
used (see below). Stimuli and response effects consisted of ran-
dom clouds of dots presented as single white pixels in a 100 by
100 white reference frame on black background (Figure 1). They
were presented on a 17 ′′ CRT screen at a resolution of 800× 600
pixels. As explained below, we used (a) blocks with a horizontal
arrangement of stimuli, responses and effects and (b) blocks with
a vertical arrangement. Each trial started with a fixation cross dis-
played for 250 ms before the beginning of the randomly selected
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 400, 600, or 800 ms. The fixa-
tion cross was replaced by an empty reference frame. The stimulus,
a randomly generated cloud of dots was then presented for 100 ms
and was afterward replaced by an empty reference frame. In Exper-
iment 1, another cloud of dots was presented as the action effect
(presented for 400 ms) just 30 ms after the participant pressed a
key. In Experiment 2 a white 2 cm long, bold arrow was presented
as action effect on each trial instead of a cloud of dots. The arrow
could point left, right, upward, or downward.
Stimulus clouds consisted of 64 white dots. They were generated
by pairing 64 X coordinates with Y coordinate randomly without
replacement (one dot every column). Clouds presented as action
effects (Experiment 1) were generated by the identical mechanism,
but shifted to the left or to the right by 6 pixels within the reference
frame. One third of the stimulus clouds were presented centrally
(ambiguous trials) and the rest were evenly split between either
left or right and up or down (non-ambiguous trials).
For each participant, the experiment consisted of two parts
of three blocks each. Action effect compatibility as well as axis
for stimuli, responses and effects was consistent in each half. In
the first three vs. the last three blocks of the task we used a hor-
izontal vs. a vertical variant for placing stimuli, effects and for
the responses. In addition, action effects were either consistently
compatible or incompatible in the first vs. last three blocks. The
order of compatibility conditions and the order in which the task
with the horizontal vs. vertical axis were performed, were balanced
across participants. Depending on which axis was used, partici-
pants either placed the left or right index fingers on the keys 4
and 6 (left and right) or 8 and 2 (up and down) on the number
pad of a regular keyboard. Keys were covered by white stickers
of 1.5 cm diameter and the number pad was placed centrally in
front of the monitor. Within either the first vs. last three blocks
of the task just two keys and action effects (left and right or up
and down) were relevant. In this way, we avoided that partici-
pants would experience both compatible and incompatible action
effects for the same keys. Past work has suggested that apart from
external action effects, characteristics of the keys are dominant
with respect to the coding of the responses (i.e., coding by key
position; compare Hoffmann et al., 2009; Gaschler et al., 2012).
Therefore, it seemed crucial to change the keys for blocks with
compatible vs. incompatible action effects. Consider for instance,
a participant who was presented with left and right clouds of dots
as stimuli. This person executed left vs. right key presses and was
presented with compatibly placed clouds of dots as action effects in
the first three blocks. In the last three blocks, this person executed
up vs. down key presses and experienced incompatible down vs.
up action effects.
PROCEDURE
In the computerized instructions, the trial structure was explained
to the participants and they were instructed to use their index
fingers to press a key when the first cloud appeared, while the
second cloud (action effect Experiment 1) or arrow (action effect
in Experiment 2) should not be followed by a key press. Partic-
ipants were told to press the key (left vs. right or up vs. down)
that corresponded to the spatial location of the cloud within the
reference frame. They were informed that in many trials it would
be very difficult to determine the location. Our experimental con-
ditions differed with respect to how participants were instructed
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to proceed in these trials. Participants in the forced choice con-
dition were asked to spontaneously and quickly select either key
depending on their impression of the location of the cloud. It was
stressed that key presses could be false only in the sense that they
might not correspond to the impression (cf. Kubovy et al., 1998).
Thus participants in the forced choice condition were instructed
that they were selecting key presses based on the stimulus – no
matter whether this stimulus was easy or hard to categorize as left
or right (or up vs. down). In contrast, in the free choice condition
participants were instructed to freely press either left vs. right (or
upper vs. lower key) whenever the location of the cloud was hard
to determine. If the location was clear, participants were to select
the key to press accordingly.
Following the instruction, participants completed three blocks
of 120 trials each. Before action effect compatibility (and axis
of stimuli, responses, and effects) was reversed for the last three
blocks, participants completed an intermediate task of 120 choice
reaction trials without programed action effects. Participants were
randomly presented either letter D or H centrally on the screen and
had to press the key corresponding to the letter on the keyboard
with their index fingers. The intermediate block served as a base-
line for comparing general speed in the two instruction groups
and as a buffer between the assessment of speed with compati-
ble vs. incompatible action effects. After each block, participants
received feedback concerning their mean latency. The experiment
was completed within approximately 60 min.
RESULTS
PRACTICE-RELATED CHANGES IN HOW ACTION EFFECT
COMPATIBILITY AFFECTED RTs
Figure 2 displays the mean RTs per block and condition aver-
aged over participants. RTs decreased with practice for ambigu-
ous and non-ambiguous trials, both in the free choice and in
the forced choice condition. In Experiment 1, compatibility of
response effects increasingly influenced RT over the course of the
three blocks in the free choice condition while it had no influence
in the forced choice condition. These impressions were confirmed
by a 2 (compatibility of effects: compatible vs. incompatible)× 2
(ambiguity of stimuli: ambiguous vs. non-ambiguous)× 3 (prac-
tice: Block 1–3)× 2 (instruction: free choice vs. forced choice)
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). Here and elsewhere we
applied Greenhouse–Geisser correction if warranted. There was
a main effect of practice, F(1.7, 93.22)= 20.87, p< 0.001, η2p =
0.28, and one of ambiguity,F(1, 55)= 89.72,p< 0.001,η2p = 0.62.
In both groups of participants, non-ambiguous trials evoked faster
key presses than ambiguous ones. Given the tendency of reverse
effects of compatibility late vs. early in training, there was no main
effect of compatibility, F < 1. Most relevant for the experimen-
tal hypothesis, action effect compatibility increasingly influenced
response speed with practice in the free choice instruction con-
dition, while no such dynamic was evident in the forced choice
condition. This was reflected by an interaction of compatibil-
ity, practice, and instruction condition, F(1.75, 95.99)= 3.32,
p= 0.047, η2p = 0.06. Furthermore, the speedup with practice
was more pronounced in ambiguous as compared to the non-
ambiguous trials, F(1.99, 109.18)= 18.7, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.25,
for the interaction. As this was first and foremost based on the
compatible trials, there was also a triple interaction of compat-
ibility, ambiguity, and practice, F(1.77, 97.22)= 3.65, p= 0.035,
η2p = 0.06. The interaction of compatibility and practice was
not significant, F(1.75, 95.99)= 2.76, p= 0.075, η2p = 0.05 (other
Fs< 1.8).
In deviation to Experiment 1, there was an effect of action
effect compatibility from the first block onward in Experiment
2, both in the free choice as well as in the forced choice condi-
tion. Interestingly, there was a tendency for the quickly established
effect to decrease with practice in the forced choice condition
while it was stable in the free choice condition. In variation to
Experiment 1, RTs were lower for ambiguous as compared to
non-ambiguous trials. The ANOVA documented a main effect of
ambiguity, F(1, 65)= 161.98, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.71, one of prac-
tice, F(1.59, 103.39)= 51.85, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.44, and one of
compatibility,F(1,65)= 13.49,p< 0.001,η2p = 0.17. The decrease
FIGURE 2 | Reaction times per block and condition in Experiments 1 and 2.The error bars in this and all other graphs reflect ± the standard error of the
compatibility effect at each factor level of the other factors.
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of the impact of ambiguity on RT with practice was reflected in
an interaction with ambiguity, F(1.88, 122.41)= 25.58, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.28. As this reduction was more pronounced for the partic-
ipants in the forced choice as opposed to those in the free choice
condition, there was a triple interaction of instruction, ambigu-
ity, and practice, F(1.88, 122.41)= 3.7, p= 0.03, η2p = 0.05. This
differential reduction in RT seemed to be driven by the incompat-
ible rather than by the compatible trials. However, the interaction
of compatibility, instruction, ambiguity, and practice was not
significant, F(1.55, 100.76)= 2.58, p= 0.094, η2p = 0.04 (other
Fs< 2.3).
Our results on response speed in the additional choice reaction
task without artificial action effects (reacting with key D vs. H to
letter D vs. H) rule out sampling biases between the two instruc-
tion conditions. In Experiment 1, participants assigned to the free
choice (M = 394.6 ms) and the forced choice (M = 394.2 ms) con-
dition in the main task performed at identical speed in this extra
task (M = 393.1 ms vs. M = 383.5 ms for Experiment 2).
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Experiment 1 and 2 only differed with respect to the action effects.
However, the pattern of RT results reported above was rather dif-
ferent in a setup in which clouds of dots were used as stimuli and
effects (Experiment 1) or only as stimuli (Experiment 2, arrows as
effects). Aiming at first suggestions for explanations for this sur-
prising difference, additional analyses were performed on choice
and RTs. We investigated how choice in ambiguous trials differed
after free choice vs. forced choice instruction, whether action effect
compatibility influenced response choice, and how the switching
between ambiguous and non-ambiguous trials affected perfor-
mance. To foreshadow, the analyses document that action effect
compatibility and instruction (forced choice vs. free choice) influ-
enced choice and RTs in both experiments. While in Experiment
1, effects were found either in RTs or in choice, the effects were less
mixed and more straightforward in Experiment 2. Conceivably,
the specific feature of Experiment 1 that was responsible for the
difference was the high overlap between stimuli and effects. We
assume that participants faced difficulties in differentiating stim-
uli and effects. Likely, they chose responses such that the overlap
was reduced or were slowed down.
We analyzed response choice in order to check whether partic-
ipants were attending and processing the location of the clouds.
One has to bear in mind that participants were to either choose
freely or respond according to their impression of the stimulus.
They received no feedback. Stimuli were presented only briefly
and the position of the non-ambiguous clouds was only slightly
shifted away from the center of the reference frame (compare
Figure 1). Thus, a ceiling effect in stimulus-following trials with
non-ambiguous stimuli was not to be expected. In the following
we will first present summary analyses of the choice data focusing
on the extent to which both possible responses were used with
balanced frequency in a block. We will then proceed to analyses
focusing on sequencing aspects of stimuli, effects, and responses
and report to which extent the position of the cloud of dots
in the reference frame determined responses in non-ambiguous
trials.
Compatibility and instructions driving deviations from balanced
response frequencies
We analyzed idiosyncratic response biases in order to (a) check
the validity of our instruction manipulation and to (b) test the
impact of compatibility. Concerning the latter issue, it has been
suggested that generation of random response patterns is resource
demanding and that deviations from randomness can increase
under challenging task demands (cf. Jahanshahi et al., 2006). Thus,
deviations from randomness (in our case indicated by deviation
from balanced frequencies) might be larger in blocks with incom-
patible response effects. With respect to potential challenges to the
validity of our free choice instruction, one should consider that
many participants might not invest the effort to choose a response
trial-by-trial. Rather, they may press one key “per default” on the
ambiguous trials. As we cannot know in advance which of the
two keys this might be, we calculated the deviation from balanced
response frequencies. For each participant, block, compatibility,
and ambiguity condition we determined the (absolute) devia-
tion from pressing both keys with 50% frequency. As Figure 3
shows, this bias was higher in the ambiguous as compared to the
non-ambiguous trials. It was more pronounced in blocks with
incompatible rather than compatible action effects. Furthermore,
it increased with practice. For Experiment 1 the 2 (compatibility
of effects: compatible vs. incompatible)× 2 (ambiguity of stim-
uli: ambiguous vs. non-ambiguous)× 3 (practice: Block 1–3)× 2
(instruction: free choice vs. forced choice) ANOVA yielded a main
effect of compatibility, F(1, 55)= 7.68, p= 0.008, η2p = 0.12,
a main effect of stimulus discriminability, F(1, 55)= 170.27,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.76, and one of practice, F(1.98, 109.11)= 3.55,
p= 0.033, η2p = 0.06 (other Fs< 2.08).
For Experiment 2 the same ANOVA documented a main effect
of ambiguity, F(1, 65)= 190.58, p< 0.001,η2p = 0.75. The impact
of ambiguity on deviation from balanced response frequencies was
larger in the forced choice than in the free choice condition, F(1,
65)= 4.66, p= 0.035, η2p = 0.07, for the interaction of instruc-
tion condition and ambiguity. This means, participants who were
instructed to respond to difficult stimuli spontaneously accord-
ing to their impression of the stimulus were more biased toward
one response than the participants who were instructed to freely
choose a key in case of difficult stimuli. There was no main effect
of compatibility (F < 1), but there was a tendency toward an inter-
action of instruction condition and compatibility, F(1, 65)= 3.06,
p= 0.085, η2p = 0.05. While in the forced choice condition the
blocks with incompatible action effects led to ∆= 1% more devi-
ation from balance than compatible blocks, this was reversed for
the free choice instruction condition (∆= 0.98%). Furthermore,
there was a tendency toward a main effect of instruction con-
dition as the deviation from balanced response frequencies was
1.47% higher overall in the forced choice compared to the free
choice condition, F(1, 65)= 2.86, p= 0.095, η2p = 0.04 (other
Fs< 1.46).
In summary, the results suggest that stereotyped responding
does not seem to be a problem that threatens the validity of the
free choice instruction condition. The deviation from balanced fre-
quencies was not larger in the free choice as compared to the forced
choice condition – rather the opposite was true. Furthermore, we
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observed a larger deviation from randomness in the incompat-
ible blocks (i.e., the more demanding condition, cf. Jahanshahi
et al., 2006). In addition, the choice data document an impact of
action effect compatibility even at the beginning of Experiment 1,
and instructions (free choice vs. forced choice) modulated choice
behavior.
Proportion of response repetitions affected by compatibility
Response repetitions in free choice trials have been suggested as a
measure of feature binding (e.g., Janczyk et al., 2012a). As action
effect compatibility was administered in a blocked manner, a repe-
tition of the response led to a repetition of the action effect as well.
Binding between actions and effects might foster response repe-
titions: when a participant pressed a key, an effect was presented.
The effect just presented might have activated the response just
given to elicit this effect.
Figure 4 shows that the proportion of response repetitions
depended on practice as well as on stimulus ambiguity and action
effect compatibility. For Experiment 1 the ANOVA yielded a main
effect of compatibility, F(1, 55)= 28.25, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.34.
Incompatible blocks led to more repetitions as compared to com-
patible blocks. The proportion of repetitions increased with prac-
tice, F(2, 104.52)= 3.73, p= 0.029, η2p = 0.06. Furthermore, the
impact of compatibility on the rate of response repetitions was
more pronounced in ambiguous rather than non-ambiguous tri-
als, F(1, 55)= 23.98, p< 0.001,η2p = 0.3, for the interaction effect
(other Fs< 1.76).
The ANOVA for Experiment 2 only confirmed that there were
more response repetitions in ambiguous as compared to non-
ambiguous trials, F(1, 65)= 13.55, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.17. Some-
what surprisingly, there was an interaction of compatibility, ambi-
guity, practice, and instruction condition apparently reflecting
the peak in response repetitions in Block 2 of the incompatible
ambiguous trials in the free choice condition, F(2, 129.99)= 4.19,
p= 0.017, η2p = 0.06 (other Fs< 1.57).
Taken together the results suggest that the overlap between
stimuli and effects in Experiment 1 led participants to avoid
response repetitions. They were apparently doing so especially in
ambiguous trials, in blocks with compatible action effects, and at
the beginning of the experiment. One can speculate that perceiving
FIGURE 3 | Deviation from balanced response frequencies.
FIGURE 4 |Time course for proportion of response repetitions.
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the effect on the side of the response led to a contrast effect that fos-
tered response alternation to ambiguous stimuli. If, for instance,
the participant pressed the left key and saw a cloud of dots shifted
left, it might have become apparent that this effect (as opposed to
ambiguous stimuli) was clearly positioned on the left. This might
have evoked the tendency to try the opposite response on the next
ambiguous stimulus. We will follow up on this in the next section.
Instructions and past trial ambiguity affecting proportion of
response repetitions
In a second step we focused on ambiguous trials and the trials
immediately preceding them. We separately calculated the propor-
tion of response repetitions separately for ambiguous trials follow-
ing non-ambiguous or ambiguous ones. The data were subjected
to a 2 (compatibility of effects: compatible vs. incompatible)× 2
(ambiguity of stimuli in previous trial : was ambiguous vs. was
non-ambiguous)× 2 (instruction: free choice vs. forced choice)
ANOVA. Mirroring the analysis in the last section, participants in
Experiment 1 were more likely to repeat the response of the previ-
ous trial in blocks with incompatible rather than compatible action
effects, F(1, 55)= 29.57, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.35. Figure 5 further
suggests that participants were more likely to repeat the response
if the stimulus in the prior trial was ambiguous rather than non-
ambiguous, F(1, 55)= 20.8, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.27. Further, there
was an interaction of instruction condition and ambiguity in
the previous trial, F(1, 55)= 20.8, p= 0.036, η2p = 0.08 (other
Fs< 1.7). The impact of past trial ambiguity on chance to repeat
the response in the current ambiguous trial was higher in the
condition with the forced choice instructions as compared to the
condition with the free choice instructions. Participants for whom
instructions had suggested to discriminate the spatial position of
an ambiguously placed cloud of dots were more likely to repeat the
response as compared to those participants who were instructed
to freely press any key.
In Experiment 2 we obtained a similar increase of the rate
of response repetitions in ambiguous trials following ambigu-
ous rather than non-ambiguous trials,F(1, 65)= 23.18, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.26. Compatibility had no effect (F < 1). Furthermore,
there was a tendency toward an interaction of compatibility
and ambiguity in the previous trial, F(1, 65)= 3.23, p= 0.077,
η2p = 0.05. If the previous trial was non-ambiguous, participants
were by M = 1.99% more likely to repeat the response in con-
ditions with incompatible as compared to compatible response
effects. However, if the previous trial was ambiguous, the compat-
ibility effect was reversed (M = 1.81% less response repetitions in
incompatible as compared to compatible blocks; other Fs< 1).
In summary, supporting the validity of our instruction manip-
ulation, the impact of characteristics of past and present stimuli
on response choice was larger in the forced choice instruction con-
dition than in the free choice condition. While the feature binding
account (cf. Herwig and Waszak, 2012; Janczyk et al., 2012a) would
have predicted that the rate of response repetitions should be high-
est when effects match stimuli and stimuli repeat, we found the
highest rate of response repetition in blocks with incompatible
action effects and especially so if the preceding stimulus had been
ambiguous as well. It is conceivable, that in Experiment 1, incom-
patible action effects as well as response alternations helped to
disentangle stimuli (to be reacted to) from effects (no reaction
required) which overruled any potential positive effects of action
effect binding on response repetition.
Instruction, compatibility, and practice affecting stimulus-following
in non-ambiguous trials
Next we scrutinized whether participants followed the non-
ambiguous stimuli in their response choices. We were interested
in whether free choice instructions concerning the ambiguous
stimuli were also affecting the non-ambiguous ones. Furthermore,
practice-related changes in stimulus-following and the impact of
action effect compatibility were of interest.
As suggested by Figure 6, the rate of stimulus-following in
non-ambiguous trials was higher in compatible as compared to
incompatible blocks and deteriorated with practice. For Exper-
iment 1 the 2 (compatibility of effects: compatible vs. incom-
patible)× 2 (ambiguity of stimuli in previous trial : ambiguous
vs. non-ambiguous)× 3 (practice: Block 1–3)× 2 (instruction:
free choice vs. forced choice) ANOVA yielded a main effect of
instruction condition, F(1, 55)= 4.51, p= 0.038, η2p = 0.08. Par-
ticipants in the forced choice instruction condition more often
FIGURE 5 | Proportion of response repetitions in ambiguous trials depending on trial history and action effect compatibility.
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FIGURE 6 |Time course of proportion of trials with non-ambiguous stimuli in which participants followed the stimulus in their response choice.
based their responses on the position of the cloud of dots than
participants in the free choice condition. Further, there was a
main effect of compatibility, F(1, 55)= 6.25, p= 0.015, η2p = 0.1.
Participants more often followed the response suggested by the
stimulus in blocks with compatible rather than in incompati-
ble effects. In the former case the response was in line with the
upcoming effect. The main effect of ambiguity of the previous
stimulus, F(1, 55)= 23.11, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.3, reflected that par-
ticipants less often responded according to the non-ambiguous
stimulus if the previous stimulus had been ambiguous rather
than non-ambiguous. This was especially pronounced in the free
choice rather than in the forced choice condition,F(1, 55)= 10.45,
p= 0.002, η2p = 0.16, for the interaction of instruction condition
and prior ambiguity. Stimulus-following decreased with practice,
F(1.76, 96.71)= 23.46, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.3. There was a tendency
of a qualification suggesting that the decline might be steeper in
the free choice instruction condition rather than in the forced
choice instruction condition. The interaction between instruction
condition and practice was not significant, F(1.76, 96.71)= 2.52,
p= 0.092, η2p = 0.04.
Furthermore, the advantage of stimulus-following in com-
patible compared to incompatible blocks was more pronounced
after non-ambiguous rather than after ambiguous trials, F(1,
55)= 7.22, p= 0.01, η2p = 0.12, for the interaction. The decrease
in stimulus-following with practice was strongest for trials after
ambiguous ones in the free choice condition,F(1.75,95.99)= 3.94,
p= 0.028, η2p = 0.07, for the interaction of prior ambiguity,
practice, and instruction condition (other Fs< 2.08).
Participants in Experiment 2 also more often followed the stim-
ulus in blocks with compatible rather than incompatible action
effects,F(1, 65)= 14.4,p< 0.001,η2p = 0.18, for the main effect of
compatibility. Stimulus-following deteriorated with practice, F(1,
65)= 10.38, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.14. The advantage of the forced
choice instruction condition over the free choice condition in
stimulus-following was 3.12% if the previous trial was ambiguous,
but instruction conditions differed by only 1.55%, if the previous
trial was non-ambiguous. This led to an interaction of instruc-
tion condition and prior ambiguity, F(1, 65)= 4.62, p= 0.035,
η2p = 0.07. In tendency, the decline in stimulus-following was
steeper for trials following ambiguous rather than non-ambiguous
trials. The interaction of prior ambiguity and practice was not
significant, F(1.93, 125.18)= 2.74, p= 0.007, η2p = 0.04 (other
Fs< 1.83). The graph shows that the standard error of the com-
patibility effect was much larger in Experiment 2 as compared
to Experiment 1. This was because some of the participants in
Experiment 2 were influenced by the compatibility of the action
effects much more strongly than others. Apparently, incompatible
arrows as action effects led them to reverse responses to the non-
ambiguous stimuli in many trials. Thus, while the arrows as action
effects were likely not to be confused with the stimuli, the response
to the cloud of dots was nevertheless biased by the compatibility
of the action effects.
Taken together, the validity of the instruction manipulation was
again supported. Stimulus-following was stronger in the forced
choice instruction condition than in the free choice condition –
yet the impact of the stimulus position on response choice was
substantial even in the latter condition. While there was an effect
of action effect compatibility on stimulus-following in all condi-
tions of Experiment 2, the compatibility effect in Experiment 1
depended upon the interaction of trial history and instruction.
Switching costs
On the one hand, mode of action control might show some inertia
and transfer from ambiguous to non-ambiguous trials (cf. Pfister
et al., 2010 and results reported above). On the other hand, instruc-
tions in the free choice condition might, in principle, have led to
the configuration of two different task sets, one with stimulus
based and one with intention based action control, with partic-
ipants switching between these two task sets on a trial-by-trial
basis. Switching between ambiguous and non-ambiguous stimuli
might therefore have involved switch costs for participants in the
free choice instruction condition. For participants in the forced
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choice instruction condition, such a switch was not suggested by
the instructions as they were told to respond according to their
impression of the stimulus in all trials. In order to obtain a full
picture of events repeating vs. alternating from one trial to the
next, we split the analysis for compatible vs. incompatible action
effects.
As shown in Figure 7, the impact of action effect compatibil-
ity on RT in Experiment 1 depended on which type of trial was
present before the current non-ambiguous trial. This seemed to
be especially pronounced in the free choice instruction condition.
Incompatible effects led to slowing especially if the past trial was
a non-ambiguous trial with a stimulus different to the one in
the current trial. In this case the (incompatible) action effect of
the previous trial was highly similar to the stimulus in the cur-
rent one. Conversely, participants were especially fast when they
switched from one non-ambiguous stimulus and its compatible
effect to the opposite stimulus and effect. It is conceivable that
participants ran the risk of confusing effects and stimuli when-
ever effects were identical to upcoming stimuli and were therefore
slowed. This account is speculative. It should be stressed that the
analysis also showed that there was a substantial RT effect of action
affect compatibility in some conditions in Experiment 1.
Apart from RT effects of action effect compatibility, we
observed costs of switching from an ambiguous stimulus to a
non-ambiguous one. This effect did not merely reflect costs of
a stimulus alternation between subsequent trials. Rather, RTs
after ambiguous trials were slower than both RTs after non-
ambiguous trials with repeating vs. alternating stimuli. For Exper-
iment 1 the ANOVA showed a main effect of previous stim-
ulus, F(1.89, 102.71)= 5.51, p= 0.005, η2p = 0.09, as well as
FIGURE 7 | RTs in trials with non-ambiguous stimuli depending on trial history and action effect compatibility.
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an interaction of compatibility and previous stimulus, F(1.99,
109.17)= 8.07, p= 0.001, η2p = 0.13 (other Fs< 1.48). In Exper-
iment 2 there was also a main effect of previous stimulus type,
F(1.84, 119.64)= 10.13, p< 0.001,η2p = 0.14. Furthermore, there
was a main effect of compatibility, F(1, 65)= 18.44, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.22 (other Fs< 1).
We expected trial history to have a larger impact in the free
choice as compared to the forced choice instruction condition.
According to the instructions, task switching and the respective
costs might have been involved in the former but not in the lat-
ter. In the free choice condition the instruction suggested different
task sets for ambiguous (free choice) vs. non-ambiguous stimuli
(respond according to stimulus) whereas in the forced choice con-
dition the task was always to respond according to the impression
that the stimulus produces. While the pattern of means in Figure 7
seems consistent with this view, the ANOVA did not confirm an
instruction effect. Potentially, the higher RT following an ambigu-
ous trial rather reflects aftereffects of adaptation to conflict or
difficulty (e.g., Dreisbach and Fischer, 2011).
SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Supporting the validity of the instruction manipulation, the
impact of characteristics of past and present stimuli on response
choice was larger in the forced choice as compared to the free
choice instruction condition. Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2
show that whether action effect compatibility influences response
speed and/or response choice is highly dependent upon context
factors such as instruction (forced choice vs. free choice) and the
specific combination of stimuli and effects employed in the exper-
iment. The additional analyses provide important qualifications
for the interpretation of the RT results initially presented. The
impression might have been that action effect associations had
to be acquired over the course of practice in Experiment 1 and
that this acquisition took place only in the free choice condition.
Response choice however, was affected by action effect compatibil-
ity, stimulus discriminability, and instruction already early in prac-
tice. The choice data strengthen the argument that the instructed
task set modulates the impact of action effect compatibility on
performance.
DISCUSSION
The present work aimed at developing an experimental paradigm
that allows to flexibly vary the choice character of a task involv-
ing action effect learning. The role of intention based vs. stimulus
based action control in the acquisition and/or expression of action
effect associations is currently under debate (Herwig and Waszak,
2009, 2012; Pfister et al., 2011). We assumed that flexible experi-
mental variation of mode of action control can either be granted
by varying instruction while keeping the stimuli identical and/or
by varying stimulus discriminability. Therefore, we designed a par-
adigm in which participants received visual stimuli, some of which
were ambiguous. Clouds of random dots were either briefly pre-
sented shifted toward one boarder of a reference frame or were
presented centrally. Responses were followed by predictable visual
effects – clouds of dots shifted in position in Experiment 1, or
arrows in Experiment 2. The influence of action effect anticipa-
tion on performance was assessed by comparing the RT for blocks
in which response position and action effect mismatched (incom-
patible) vs. matched (compatible). In addition we analyzed which
reaction participants chose. We targeted the mode of action con-
trol by an instruction manipulation. Instructions either suggested
to the participants that difficult to discriminate stimuli should
evoke a spontaneous key press (free choice condition) or a spon-
taneous reaction in accordance with the first impression that the
stimulus leaves (forced choice condition). In line with Pfister et al.
(2011) the reported findings suggest that action effect associations
can be acquired when instructions suggest a stimulus based action
control mode or an intention based action control mode. However,
instructions moderated how action effect associations influenced
performance.
INSTRUCTION-INDUCED ACTION MODE
Our results suggest that the instruction-induced mode of action
control can determine how and when action effect compatibil-
ity influences task performance in conditions that only differ in
instructions. For ambiguous as well as for non-ambiguous stim-
uli, the impact of action effect compatibility on RT and response
choice depended upon what the instructions suggested concern-
ing the difficult to discriminate trials. In Experiment 1, free choice
instructions had the consequence that with practice action effect
compatibility gained influence on RT. With forced choice instruc-
tions, there was no RT effect. However, analysis of response choice
suggested that action effect compatibility influenced performance
throughout practice in all instruction conditions. In Experiment
2, we observed effects of action effect compatibility on RT and on
choice in all conditions from the first block onward. With practice,
however, the RT effect of action effect compatibility vanished in
the forced choice instruction condition.
We assume that instructions helped to establish or maintain
stimulus based vs. intention based action control. While the impact
of graded variations of stimulus discriminability on action mode
remains to be explored for the future, the current data provide an
example that instructions can overrule extreme cases of stimulus
discriminability. Participants who were told to freely press any key
in case of difficult to discriminate stimuli apparently transferred
this free choice mode of action control even to easily discriminable
stimuli. In a similar vein, Pfister et al. (2010) have suggested that
once an intention based mode of action control is established due
to free choice trials, this mode of action control might also transfer
to trials with an imperative stimulus. In the present case, ambigu-
ous and non-ambiguous trials were randomly intermixed. This
might make such transfer likely (compare Experiment 2 of Pfister
et al., 2010). Furthermore, the mixture ensured that participants
paid attention to the discriminative characteristics of the stimulus
for ambiguous and non-ambiguous trials alike.
At first glance the above considerations seem contradictory. On
the one hand, instructions concerning trials in which the position
of the cloud of dots was difficult to determine affected whether
or not with practice an influence of action effect compatibility on
RT was observed – both for ambiguous and for non-ambiguous
trials. Therefore, the influence of instructions seemed to operate
at a general level. On the other hand, response choice in non-
ambiguous trials clearly showed that the response was determined
by the stimulus in most trials. Apparently, action was intention
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based but at the same time influenced by the stimulus. This find-
ing is in line with work from implicit sequence learning stressing
that in choice reaction tasks, the processing and implicit learning of
response goals can outweigh processing and learning concerning
the stimuli – despite participants are generally reacting accurately
to the stimuli (cf. Willingham et al., 2000; Ziessler and Nattkem-
per, 2001; Hazeltine, 2002; Abrahamse et al., 2010; Gaschler et al.,
2012). These results can be reconciled by proposing some inertia
to intentional action control. At least, before strong S-R links are
established, action control can be intentional in choice reaction
tasks (Ackerman and Woltz, 1994; Hommel, 2000). Interspersed
free choice trials might counteract a shift from intention based
action control to largely stimulus based performance that might
otherwise take place with practice.
As a note of caution we have to admit that in the current study
we aimed at manipulating mode of action control but lack a mea-
sure of mode of action control that is independent of the main
dependent variables. A manipulation check probing the efficacy of
instructions to establish one vs. the other task set has for instance
been employed in Gaschler et al. (2012). It should be developed
for the current purpose as well to avoid circularity of arguments.
A further issue is the general decrease of stimulus-following in
non-ambiguous trials with block of practice. It might contradict
the idea that performance becomes less intention based and more
stimulus based with practice. Alternatively, stimulus based pro-
cessing may with practice be applied more homogeneously to most
non-ambiguous and ambiguous trials. Lapses of attention might
set in with practice and lead to a situation where in some trials
neither stimuli nor effects are attended to.
STIMULI RESEMBLING ACTION EFFECTS
In Experiment 1 action effects were very similar to the stimuli.
This similarity ensured that the visual action effects were attended
to. However, action effect compatibility with effects similar to the
stimuli might be considered as a special case. This case has previ-
ously been investigated with biological stimuli. For instance, Brass
et al. (2000), studied compatibility between observed and exe-
cuted finger movements. Future research should manipulate the
nature of and the overlap between stimuli and effects more sys-
tematically. In the current study it is likely that at the same time
we changed stimulus-effect overlap and effect saliency when we
changed from clouds of dots as action effects (Experiment 1) to
arrows (Experiment 2). We assume that in the beginning, when
confronted with a novel task, the quickly acquired action effect
associations could impact RT in Experiment 2, as there were no
problems of overlap between stimuli and effects. Intention based
control may have been effective early on, being partially substi-
tuted by stimulus based control with practice (cf. Ackerman and
Woltz, 1994). This might have led to the reduction of the impact of
action effect compatibility on RT in the forced choice instruction
condition of Experiment 2. Future studies should explore poten-
tial tradeoffs between action effect compatibility affecting RT vs.
choice.
The comparison of the experiments suggests that stimulus-
effect compatibility is but one source that influences response
choice. The impact of action effect compatibility on response
choice was not restricted to the setup with overlapping stimuli
and effects. With arrows as action effects (Experiment 2) stimulus-
following for non-ambiguous stimuli was higher in blocks with
compatible as compared to incompatible effects. Furthermore,
comparing how the influence of action effect compatibility on
RT changes with practice in Experiment 1 and 2 illustrates that
results can critically depend upon when the assessment of action
effect associations takes place and which measures are being con-
sidered. Compatibility had an influence on RT at the end of
practice in the free choice condition for ambiguous and non-
ambiguous trials in both experiments. Throughout practice, the
forced choice condition showed no RT effect of action effect com-
patibility in Experiment 1. However, when stimuli and effects
did not overlap (Experiment 2) the pattern was different. Par-
ticipants in the forced choice condition showed an influence of
action effect compatibility in early blocks which apparently van-
ished when responding supposedly became more stimulus driven
with practice. We assume that action effect compatibility played
out earlier in practice in RTs of Experiment 2 as compared to
Experiment 1, because the arrows as action effects were (a) salient
and (b) were easy to tell apart from the stimuli. Occasional reports
by participants in Experiment 1 suggest that it could be some-
what of a challenge not to start responding to the action effects.
For instance, non-ambiguous stimuli and action effects could only
be held apart by relying on temporal context information (fixa-
tion cross, response, presentation time). Placing special emphasis
on avoiding to react to the action effects might have led to con-
flict driven down-weighting of the action effects (compare, e.g.,
Hommel et al., 2001; Kruschke, 2003). Once that practice with
the task might have helped to establish the context to avoid the
risk of such confusions, task processing might have become more
stimulus based. One can thus speculate that two changes with prac-
tice together diminished the impact of action effect compatibility
on RT.
Surprisingly, Experiment 1 and 2 differed with respect to
speed on ambiguous vs. non-ambiguous trials. Instructions sug-
gested to the participants that difficult to discriminate stimuli
could be responded to quickly – either by a spontaneous free
choice (free choice condition) or by spontaneously reacting to
the impression that the stimulus leaves. Following the sugges-
tion to choose or react quickly and spontaneously, participants
in Experiment 2 reacted faster to ambiguous compared to non-
ambiguous trials. In Experiment 1, however, ambiguous trials
led to slower responses compared to non-ambiguous trials. As
action effects and their overlap with the stimuli were the only
difference between Experiment 1 and 2, this variation may be
responsible for this difference. In Experiment 1, clouds of dots
shifted toward one of the borders of the reference frame were
presented as action effect in each trial and as stimulus in two
thirds of the trials. Clouds in the center of the reference frame
were therefore rare compared to clouds close to one of the board-
ers of the reference frame. This frequency difference may have
contributed to the slowing (e.g., Fitts et al., 1963). Furthermore,
the analysis of choice data suggested that participants might have
faced problems in disentangling stimuli and effects in Experi-
ment 1 (whereas this distinction was clear in Experiment 2).
Ambiguous trials in Experiment 1 were special in that they consti-
tuted the only case in which the position of the cloud of dots
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could not be judged with some certainty. The position of the
cloud of dots could be discriminated in the non-ambiguous tri-
als and in the action effects. Ironically, a response was therefore
required for those events on the screen that were the hardest to
categorize.
In order to integrate (a) the effects of instructed action mode
and (b) the surprising difference when using clouds of dots vs.
arrows as action effects, one might suggest that free choice leads to
the anticipation of action effects in situations in which the effects
would otherwise be only minimally processed. Conditions of oth-
erwise reduced anticipation of action effects might include cases
where effects are of low salience (cf. Janczyk et al., 2012b,c), the
choice reaction task is characterized by a simple mapping that
should render stimulus based control feasible (cf. Herwig and
Waszak,2009),or a choice reaction task in which stimuli and effects
overlap such that action effects might be down-weighted in order
to reduce crosstalk (e.g., Experiment 1). With demanding choice
reaction tasks and/or salient effects, however, effect anticipation
might be substantial irrespective of instructed action mode.
DEBATED CONCEPTS WITH BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES
One could debate the extent to which free choice tasks differ from
forced choice tasks in a way that can be described in a theoretically
coherent manner (cf. Walter, 2002). However, empirical research
suggests that the mode of action implied in forced choice vs. free
choice behavior makes a difference at some level of processing
as it has consequences for the acquisition/expression of action
effect knowledge (cf. Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig and Waszak,
2009; Pfister et al., 2011). Recently Neuringer and Jensen (2010)
have bypassed philosophical problems of the free will debate by
proposing a behavioral account of operant action that empha-
sizes the role of variability in action as well as adaptive and
task contingent changes in variability of action. However, while
the above accounts might be taken to suggest that structure of
the task material (i.e., discriminability of stimuli) and variabil-
ity of action (i.e., variability of key presses) are the dominant
constituents of intention based vs. stimulus based action mode,
our results suggest a surprisingly constructivist perspective of
action control. Apart from the instructions, people in the free
choice vs. forced choice condition were confronted with identi-
cal task material and showed similar amounts of variability in
behavior. Yet, action effect compatibility played out differently
in these conditions. One could have doubted the power of the
instruction manipulation. One could have expected that irre-
spective of instructions, the objectively indiscriminable stimuli
(ambiguous, centrally placed clouds of dots) would have led to
guessing behavior, internally chosen action, and an impact of
action effect knowledge on RT and choice. From this perspec-
tive, non-ambiguous stimuli (clouds of dots placed close to one
of the borders of the frame) should have led to stimulus driven
action control, reducing the impact of action effect knowledge
on RT and choice. Indeed, irrespective of instruction, stimuli
that could be discriminated were responded to according to their
spatial stimulus characteristics in the large majority of the tri-
als rather than based on guessing. With respect to the usage of
action effect knowledge, however, the impact of instructions on
task processing seemed to be stronger than the impact of stimu-
lus characteristics, as the instructions concerning the ambiguous
stimuli also influenced performance in trials with non-ambiguous
stimuli.
The findings of the current study stress the importance of con-
sidering the dynamics of the acquisition of action effect knowledge
and the dynamics of action control modes. The results suggest that
the mode of action control (stimulus based vs. intention based)
can be influenced quickly by the instructions but might be sub-
jected to practice-related changes some of which are slow. While
strong in the beginning, the RT effect of action effect compatibility
had vanished in the choice reaction condition of Experiment 2 by
the end of practice. Therefore, taking a snapshot at a single point
in time might have led to the wrong conclusions. Wolfensteller
and Ruge (2011) have recently presented an approach includ-
ing tests of action effect knowledge at different points in time
over the course of practice, but did not vary action mode. We
extended their results by providing evidence that there might
be practice-related changes in how instruction-induced mode of
action control influences the impact of action effect associations
on behavior.
With its strong emphasis on the impact of instruction on action
control (see also Hommel, 1993) the current research shows inter-
esting parallels to the Baldwin–Titchener debate of the end of
the nineteenth century (cf. Baldwin, 1895; Titchener, 1895). The
debate was on whether or not RTs are regularly shorter when peo-
ple concentrate on the response rather than on the stimulus. The
Wundt camp suggested that this should be the case, at least in well-
behaving research participants, as the apperception component
was reduced if emphasis was drawn to the response rather than
to the stimulus. Baldwin and followers in turn alluded to inter-
individual differences, suggesting that some people may be faster
in the stimulus based mode and others in the response based mode.
Probably, the most interesting point about the debate was one that
was not at the focus of the discussion. Either camp, the function-
alists around Baldwin as well as the structuralists from the Wundt
lab, heavily relied on the power of instruction. They instructed
participants (often the researchers themselves) to adhere to an
action mode relevant to the experiment: that is to concentrate on
the response vs. to concentrate on the stimulus.
In conclusion, the present experiments suggest that instruc-
tions can determine the mode of action control and by this the
impact of action effect associations on behavior. Predictable action
effects influenced RT and response choice differently, depending
on whether instructions had suggested free choice vs. forced choice
for ambiguous stimuli. The instruction effect transferred to non-
ambiguous stimuli. This indicates that instructions rather than
stimulus discriminability determined the extent to which action
effects were weighted relative to the stimuli.
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